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BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
on the ground that the defendant had stopped payment. The plaintiff brought
an action to recover the amount of the check and moved for summary judg-
ment. In granting the motion, the court acknowledged that under Section
4-403(1) a customer may stop payment and that under Section 4-104(1)(e)
a "customer" includes "a bank carrying an account with another bank."
However, in this case the defendant could not stop payment because it "had
no stake in the transaction whatsoever." The purpose in permitting payment
to be stopped is to protect either an actual party to an underlying trans-
action (the depositor) or the bank on which the check is drawn. The de-
fendant fell within neither class. Moreover, Section 3-802(1)(a) supported
the holding. Under that section, the depositor's underlying obligation to
the plaintiff was pro tanto discharged when the plaintiff took in satisfaction
of that obligation a check drawn by a bank which did not contain a right
of recourse against the underlying obligor. Consequently, if the defendant-
bank were not liable, the plaintiff would have no enforceable rights under
the Code. Such a result could not be tolerated since the Code was enacted
to protect persons engaged in business transactions involving instruments for
the payment of money.
COMMENT
The opinion does not state the reason why the bank stopped payment;
however, it is reasonable to assume that it did so on instruction from its
depositor, the car buyer. In this respect it should be noted that under Sec-
tion 3-306(d) the bank could not, as a general rule, have successfully inter-
posed a defense or claim belonging to its depositor. The only defenses belong-
ing to its depositor which it could have interposed are (1) that the check
was stolen, or (2) that payment or satisfaction would be inconsistent with
a restrictive indorsement.
R.G.K
ARTICLE 7: DOCUMENTS OF TITLE
SECTION 7-203. Liability for Non-Receipt or Misdescription
NATIONAL DAIRY PRODS. CORP. V. LAWRENCE AM. FIELD WAREHOUSING
CORP.
255 N.Y.S.2d 788 (App. Div. 1965)
The defendant (hereinafter Field) was a field warehouseman for Allied
Crude Oil Refining Company. The plaintiffs are holders of non-negotiable
warehouse receipts issued to them or their predecessors in interest by the
defendant in conjunction with the deposit of large quantities of soybean oil.
Four of the plaintiffs are holders of diverse security interests in the oil; the
remaining two are direct shippers of the oil. Subsequent to the issuance of
the receipts the defendant transferred its assets, including the oil, to a sec-
ond bailee. The receipts were dishonored after this transfer when it was
discovered that the oil had mysteriously disappeared. No explanation has
been offered by either party of the loss of the oil.
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The plaintiffs were awarded summary judgments at trial on the ques-
tion of Field's liability. From this judgment Field appealed. The lower
court limited the recovery of damages to the actual losses sustained by each
of the plaintiffs. From this assessment of damages the plaintiffs cross-
appealed.
At the outset the appellate court rejected the defendant's contention
that by virtue of the plaintiffs' acquiescence in the transfer of assets to the
second bailee a novation in the bailment contract was effected relieving the
defendant of all liability. The court said that the implied consent of the
plaintiffs to the transfer may have estopped them from contending that it
constituted a conversion of the goods, but it did not relieve Field of its
primary responsibility on the receipts issued by it absent a showing of in-
tent by the plaintiffs to discharge Field. This intent, the court indicated,
had to be established by more than a "simple act of delegation, notice to
the bailor, failure of the obligee to object, and even acceptance of part per-
formance from the new obligor."
Because the transactions occurred in New Jersey, that state's law was
said to control. New Jersey law raises a presumption of negligence when
the bailee is unable to deliver the bailed goods, and requires the bailee to
come forward with evidence of due care. Pleading total ignorance, as the
defendant in effect did, was insufficient, said the court. The defendant Field
was therefore liable for the dishonor of the receipts.
With respect to the amount of damages, the court first had to determine
what in fact happened to the oil. If the oil in question had never been
delivered to the defendant, those relying on the receipts issued for it would
be entitled under Section 7-203 to recover the amount of damages they
actually sustained. On the other hand, if delivery had been made, a con-
version would be deemed to have occurred, and under the general rule of
Einstein v. Dunn, 61 App. Div. 195, 70 N.Y.S. 520 (1901), aff'd on opinion
below, 171 N.Y. 648, 63 N.E. 1116 (1902), the bailee would be liable for
the full value of the bailed goods. However, there were exceptions to this
general rule, and under them, even if there were a conversion, the plaintiffs
would be able to recover only the amount of damages actually sustained, not
the face amount of the receipts. Two New York cases were cited as precedent
for the exceptions. In addition, the court cited the inherent inequity in re-
quiring the defendant to pay the face amounts of the receipts to the plain-
tiffs, who would then remit the difference between that and their actual losses
to Allied, who the defendant insists was the perpetrator of the original
fraud.
The two direct shippers were to recover the contract price of the
oil minus marginal payments received from Allied. In no event was the re-
covery to exceed the market price of the oil on the date of dishonor or the
date on which the plaintiffs learned of defendant's intention to dishonor.
The remaining plaintiff's were allowed to recover the amount of indebtedness
secured by the oil but, again, recovery could not exceed the value of the
oil on the date of dishonor or the date the intention to dishonor was
learned.
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In the course of its opinion the court noted that if the receipts were
negotiable and issued in part for nonexisting oil, then, under Section 7-207(2),
the holders of the receipts would be owners of a pro rata share of existing
oil and entitled to sue in conversion for the wrongful failure to deliver that
share on demand. However, in the case at hand, the receipts were non-
negotiable; hence the section was inapplicable.
COMMENT
1. Under Section 7-403 a bailee is, as a general rule, obligated to de-
liver bailed goods to the person entitled under the document to receive them.
However, there are enumerated instances when this obligation does not exist,
as, for example, when there has been
damage to or delay, loss or destruction of the goods for which the
bailee is not liable [but the burden of establishing in such cases
is on the person entitled to the doctiment.]. . . . Section 7-403
( 1 )(b).
The bracketed language, which is optional, refers to the federal rule in
interstate carrier cases. Under this rule, the burden of proving negligence is
on the one claiming under the document but inability to deliver the goods
raises a presumption of negligence requiring;the bailee to come forward with
evidence of due care. The New Jersey Code does not contain the optional
language, but since New Jersey case law is consistent with the federal rule,
its absence is irrelevant.
2. Under Section 7-203, if the bailee does not receive, or if he mis-
describes, goods for which he issues a document of title, he is liable to a
good faith purchaser relying thereon. The extent of his liability, as Section
7-203 makes clear, is the actual damages suffered by the purchaser. However,
the extent of liability for conversion of bailed goods is nowhere set out in
the Code, being Left by implication to local Iaw. In the instant case, the
court noted that the general rule with respect to conversion, followed in
New York, permits the person entitled under the document to recover the
value of the goods represented by the document. The court held, however,
that even assuming a conversion, the bailee would be liable only for the
losses actually sustained by the plaintiffs.1 In reaching this conclusion
the court was probably moved by a premise that in light of the pecu-
liar circumstances surrounding Allied's operations, the defendant should
not be made to suffer maximum liability. Indeed, the court's use of New
York cases as precedent, and especially its reliance on Davis v. Bliss and
Parish v. Wheeler as exceptions to the geneiral rule that the value of the
goods is the correct measure of damages, demonStrates the lengths to which it
was willing to go in order to reach the desired result. Davis v. Bliss, 187
N.Y. 77, 79 N.E. 851 (1907) held that a mortgagee in a suit for conversion
against the agent of the mortgagor could recover only the value of his
interests, i.e., the full value of the goods Minus the mortgagor's equity
therein. Parish v. Wheeler, 22 N.Y. 494, is an 1860 case holding that the
vendor in a conditional sales contract can recover only the unpaid balance
of the purchase price from the transferee of the vendee. This case, the
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court suggested, implied that where privity exists between the owner of
the goods and the converter, the plaintiff can recover only his actual losses.
Without discussing the merits of the point, the court noted that such privity
may have existed in the instant case by virtue of Allied's having originally
transferred some of the oil to the defendant.
It is submitted that the cases relied upon, neither of which involved
documents of title, are irrelevant to the issue presented in the instant case.
The court's conclusion would have rested on a less tenuous basis had it
ignored the possibility of conversion and proceeded on the equally rational
assumption that the problem was one of non-receipt covered by the damages.
provision of Section 7-203.
W.J.E., JR.
SECTION 7-403. Obligation of Warehouseman or Carrier
to Deliver; Excuse
DAVID CRYSTAL, INC. V. CUNARD STEAM-SHIP Co.
223 F. Supp. 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1963)
Annotated under Section 1-201, supra.
NATIONAL DAIRY PRODS. CORP. V. LAWRENCE AM. FIELD WAREHOUSING
CORP.
225 N.Y.S.2d 788 (App. Div. 1965)
Annotated under Section 7-203, supra.
SECTION 7-404. No Liability for Good Faith Delivery Pursuant
to Receipt or Bill
DAVID CRYSTAL, INC. V. CUNARD STEAM-SHIP Co.
223 F. Supp. 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1963)
Annotated under Section 1-201, supra.
ARTICLE 8: INVESTMENT SECURITIES
SECTION 8-301. Rights Acquired by Purchaser; "Adverse Claim";
Title Acquired by Bona Fide Purchaser
GWATNEY V. ALLIED COMPANIES, INC.
385 S.W.2d 940 (Ark. 1965)
The Great Security Life Insurance Company issued 150,000 shares of
stock to Arkansas Memorial Gardens, Inc., taking in return a deed to 698
burial places. Arkansas Memorial then sold the shares to the defendant
Harold Gwatney who had borrowed the purchase price from Tommy Russell,
the president of Arkansas Memorial. The plaintiff, a substantial shareholder
of Great Security, sought cancellation of the stock on the ground that its
issuance was unauthorized by statute. The defendant Gwatney claimed that
he was a good faith purchaser and that the stock could not be cancelled
in his hands. At trial, he testified that before buying the stock he had
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